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Abstract
The interaction between syntax (formal language) and its seman-
tics (meanings of language) is one which has been well studied in
categorical logic. The results of this particular study are employed
to understand how the brain is able to create meanings. To empha-
size the toy character of the proposed model, we prefer to speak of
the homunculus brain rather than the brain per se. The homunculus
brain consists of neurons, each of which is modeled by a category, and
axons between neurons, which are modeled by functors between the
corresponding neuron-categories. Each neuron (category) has its own
program enabling its working, i.e. a theory of this neuron. In analogy
to what is known from categorical logic, we postulate the existence of
a pair of adjoint functors, called Lang and Syn, from a category, now
called BRAIN, of categories, to a category, now called MIND, of theo-
ries. Our homunculus is a kind of “mathematical robot”, the neuronal
architecture of which is not important. Its only aim is to provide us
with the opportunity to study how such a simple brain-like structure
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could “create meanings” and perform abstraction operations out of its
purely syntactic program. The pair of adjoint functors Lang and Syn
model the mutual dependencies between the syntactical structure of
a given theory of MIND and the internal logic of its semantics given
by a category of BRAIN. In this way, a formal language (syntax) and
its meanings (semantics) are interwoven with each other in a manner
corresponding to the adjointness of the functors Lang and Syn. Higher
cognitive functions of abstraction and realization of concepts are also
modelled by a corresponding pair of adjoint functors. The categories
BRAIN and MIND interact with each other with their entire struc-
tures and, at the same time, these very structures are shaped by this
interaction.
1 Introduction: On the Computer Screen
We were preparing a paper for publication. A phase portrait was nicely
displayed on the computer screen. The network of trajectories represented
a class of solutions to the equation we were interested in. At some points,
called critical points, certain trajectories crossed each other. These points
were important for our analysis. Some of the diagrams we worked with
appeared later as figures in our publication [36]. The figures had to be
explained, so we decided to attach appropriate labels to some of the critical
points. We attached the label “stable saddle” to one of them. No problem.
Then we proceeded to attach the label “unstable saddle” to another one.
But the label jumped up. We tried to fix it up, but it jumped down. Then
we started laughing. After all, it is an unstable point!
Let us try to understand the situation. We were investigating an equa-
tion that (virtually) contains in itself its space of solutions (irrespectively of
whether we explicitly know them or not). Through the suitable computer
program and some “electronic circuits”, which are activated by the program,
this space of solutions is mapped into the phase portrait displayed on the
computer screen. The diagram we see on the screen is certainly something
more than just a picture. It does not simply show stable and unstable criti-
cal points; it also does what the abstract equation orders its solutions to do
(labels jump up and down at instabilities).
Let us go a step forward. In fact, the phase portrait on the screen is a
substitute of the world. For suppose that our equation “describes” (or better
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– models) a mechanical system (e.g., a pendulum or oscillator).1 Then the
unstable critical points of our equation correspond to physical situations in
which the considered mechanical system behaves in an unstable way. We
thus have, on the one hand, an equation (or a set of equations) or, more
broadly, a mathematical theory and, on the other hand, a domain (or an
aspect) of the physical world of which the considered mathematical theory
is a model. Between the mathematical model and the domain (or aspect) of
the physical world there is a mysterious correspondence – a correspondence
in the root-meaning of this word: both sides co-respond to each other. It is
an active correspondence, and the activity goes both ways: it looks as if the
domain of the world informed the theory about its own internal structure,
and the theory answered by prescribing what the domain should do. And
the domain does it. The equations prescribe what the world should do, and
the world executes this. The equations and the world are coupled with each
other and act in unison.
And the screen on my computer? It is a part of the world. The program
we have constructed reads the structure of the equations and executes what
the equations tell it. And because of the coupling between the equations and
the world, the computer does, in miniature, what does the world on its own
scale. This is the reason why computers are so effective in our reading of the
structure of the world.
There is another domain in which a formal structure reveals its effective
power and produces real effects. Such processes occur in the brain. The for-
mal structure in question consists of electric signals propagating along nerve
fibres between neurons across synapses, and the world of meanings should
be regarded as a product of this activity. The interaction seems to go both
ways: the “language of neurons” (what happens in the brain) produces the
meanings related to this language (in the mind), and the meanings somehow
influence the architecture of neurons.
It seems that in both these cases (mathematical laws and their effects in
the real world, and the brain – mind interactions) we meet two instances of
the same working of logic where syntax (a formal structure), by effectively
interacting with its semantics, produces real effects. This kind of interaction,
although kept strictly on the level of logic (i.e. with no reference to processes
in the real world), is well known in the categorical logic. In the present
paper, we attempt to employ these achievements of categorical logic to try
1The equations we considered in our publication referred to a cosmological situation.
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to understand the brain–mind interaction.
The traditional terminology of brain and mind (irrespective of current
trends in cognitive sciences to get rid of their conceptual load) seems espe-
cially well adapted to the present context in which general ideas are more
important than structural details. Moreover, to avoid too hasty associations
with the human brain and to emphasize the toy character of the proposed
model, we prefer to speak of the homunculus brain rather than just of brain.
The action of our argument develops along the following lines. Section
2 is a reminder on formal language, its syntax and semantics. Sections 3
and 4 briefly review those parts of categorical logic that refer to these con-
cepts. Every category, call it C, has its internal logic, and if this logic is
sufficiently rich, the category provides semantics for a certain formal theory
T . Moreover, there exists a pair of adjoint functors, called Lang and Syn,
from a category, called CATEGORIES, of categories belonging to a certain
class (for instance, coherent categories) to a category, called THEORIES,
of theories and vice versa, which describe mutual dependencies between the
syntactical structure of T and the internal logic of its semantics given by
C. This is described in section 3. In this way, syntax and semantics are
interwoven with each other in a manner corresponding to the adjointness of
the functors Lang and Syn. This is explored in section 4. In section 5, we
consider a deep categorical duality between the syntactic category of a theory
and its individual models and suggest a functional interpretation in terms of
abstraction and realization of concepts, in anticipation of the cognitive inter-
pretation to be introduced next. In section 6, the category CATEGORIES
becomes the category BRAIN. It constitutes a simple model of a homuncu-
lus’ brain. Objects of this category are categories (belonging to a certain
class); every such category models a neuron. Morphisms of this category
model signals propagating along nerve fibres between neurons. The category
THEORIES becomes the category MIND. Its objects are “theories of neu-
rons”; more precisely, if C ∈ BRAIN, then its “theory” is Lang(C) in MIND.
Morphisms of this category are functors between the corresponding syntactic
theories; more precisely, if T1, T2 ∈ MIND, then the morphism between them
is Syn(T1) → Syn(T2). The pair of adjoint functors Lang and Syn model
the interaction between the syntax of “theories” and their semantics, i.e. the
network of neurons. The categories BRAIN and MIND are indeed somehow
related to what their names refer to, at least as far as homunculus’ brain and
mind are concerned.
Following the seminal paper of W.S McCulloch and W. Pitts [23], pub-
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lished as early as in 1943, which proposed using classical logic to model neural
processes in the brain, there have been so many papers developing and mod-
ifying (with various logical systems) this idea, that to quote even a sample
of them would be immaterial (for a relatively recent state of art see a short
review [19]). A. Ehresmann [9] claims that it was R. Rosen [28] who was
the first to employ category theory to model biological systems. A series of
works followed (a non-representative sample: [12, 15, 24, 25]) proposing the
use of various parts of category theory to model different aspects of the brain
activity. In particular, adjoint functors were suggested to model “a range of
universal-selectionist mechanisms” [10]. However, we have not been able to
find something similar to modeling the interaction between brain’s language
and its meaning anywhere.
2 Syntax and Semantics
In linguistics, syntax and semantics are regarded as parts of semiotics, the
study of signs. Syntax studies relations between signs, and semantics rela-
tions between signs and what the signs refer to.2 Syntactic properties are
attributed to linguistic expressions entirely with respect to their shape (or
form). Semantics, on the other hand, endows them with meaning by refer-
ring signs to what they signify. Logic adapts these ideas to its own needs.
Since it is a formal science, the signs it considers should be elements of a
formal language, and they cannot refer to anything external. Halvorson put
it, “But a formal language is really not a language at all, since nobody reads
or writes in a formal language. Indeed, one of the primary features of these
so-called formal languages is that the symbols don’t have any meaning” [13].
This is why the meaning should be “artificially” constructed for them. The
idea of how this should be done can best be seen in Tarski’s prototype of
this procedure [33]. If a sentence s, the truth of which we want to define,
belongs to a language L then the definition of s should be formulated in a
metalanguage M with respect to the language L. And the metalanguage M
should contain a copy of s so that anything one can say with the help of s
in L, can also be said in M . The definition of “True” should be of the form
For all x, True(x) if and only if ϕ(x)
2Sometimes one also distinguishes pragmatics which studies relations between signs
and their users.
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with the condition that “True” does not occur in ϕ. Here x stands for the
copy of the sentence s in the metalanguage L, and ϕ(x) describes, also inM ,
the state of affairs of which the sentence s in L reports (for more details see
[16, 29]). A metalinguistic copy of s could also be expressed as “s” (taken in
quotes). In Tarski’s own example:
“It snows” is true iff it snows.
For pedagogical reasons, this example is taken from colloquial language, but
strictly speaking Tarski’s definition refers to formal languages. The formal
language L has its own syntax (since it is a formal language), but is lacking its
semantic reference. As we have seen, such a reference had to be constructed
for it with the help of the metalanguage M .
Now, the idea is to improve the situation by looking for such a conceptual
context in which a semantics for a given theory would arise in a more natural
(or even spontaneous) way.
3 Categorical Semantics
To do so we must first define precisely what we mean by language. Since
the definition must be precise, let us choose as an example the language of
mathematics based on standard first order logic (which is enough for most
of the usual mathematics). Many other languages may be formalized in a
similar way. In such a language we distinguish:
• constants: 0, 1, 2, . . . , a, b, c, . . . , and variables: x, y, z, . . . , which can
be combined by primitive operations to give
• terms, for example: x+y, x3, . . . which, in turn, can be combined, with
the help of primitive relations, such as =, <,≤, . . . , to produce
• formulae, for example: x + y = z, x ≤ y, . . . which, in turn can be
combined, with the help of the usual logical connectives and quantifiers,
into
• more complicated formulae.
To make the language more flexible and more adapted for concrete appli-
cations, we diversify its expressions into various types (called also sorts). In
mathematics, we might use different letters for natural and real numbers, or
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different symbols for vectors an scalars. We say that, in both cases, we are
using a two-typed language. There may be languages with as many types as
is needed.
What we need is not so much a language, but rather a theory. In math-
ematical logic theory is almost the same as language; it is a formal language
aimed at axiomatizing a certain class of sentences. The concept of theory,
as it is functioning in modern physics can, in principle, be regarded as the
special case of the logical concept of theory, although in scientific practice
theories are rarely formulated with the full logical rigor.
Let then T be a theory expressed in a multi-type language. Such a theory
is defined as consisting of the following data:
1. A set of types {X1, X2, . . . X, Y, . . . }.
2. A set of variables {x, y, z, . . . , x1, x2, x3, . . .} with a type assigned to
each variable.
3. A set of function symbols with a type assigned to each domain and
codomain of every function symbol; for instance, to the term x + y,
with the variable x1 of type X1 and the variable x2 of type X2, there
corresponds the function symbol f : X1 × X2 → Y , and the term
f(x1, y1) = x1 + x2 is of type Y .
4. A set of relation symbols with a type assigned to each argument of
every relation symbol; for instance, to the formula x+ y = z, with the
variable x of type X1, the variable y of type X2 and the variable z of
type X3, there corresponds the relation symbol R ⊆: X1 × X2 × X3,
and R(x, y, z) is an atomic formula.
5. A set of logical symbols.
6. A set of axioms for a given theory build up from terms and relation
symbols with the help of logical connectives and quantifiers, respecting
types of all terms.
This is, in fact, a purely syntactic definition of theory (for details see [6, pp.
344-348], [21, pp. 527-530]). Now, we want to create a semantics, i.e. a
model, for a theory T . This is done by constructing a category CT which will
serve us as such a model. The construction is almost obvious:
1. each type of T is an object of CT ,
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2. for each function symbol f with the types A and B of its domain and
codomain in T , correspondingly, f is a morphism from the object A to
the object B in CT ,
3
3. each variable is an identity morphism in CT ,
4. for each relation symbol R in T , its counterpart in CT is a subobject
in CT . Suppose φ is a subobject of an object A in CT then, by analogy
with the usual theory of sets, φ can be thought of as a collection of all
things of type A that verify φ.
This definition must be supplemented with all of the (first order) logic which
is used to express axioms in T (for details [17]). Roughly speaking, since
formulae correspond to subobjects, and all subobjects of a given object are
partially ordered by inclusions (they form a poset), the axioms can be ex-
pressed in terms of the order relation on the subobject poset in the category
CT . The category, defined in this way, is appropriately called the categorical
semantics for a theory T .
We have thus created (almost automatically!) a domain (the category
CT ) the theory T refers to. The internal architecture of the category CT
exactly matches the logic involved in the theory T .
Let us also mention that, vice versa, having a (sufficiently rich) category
C ′, we can construct the formal theory T ′ the logic of which matches the
internal architecture of the category C ′. This can be done by reading the
above definition of the categorical semantics “backward”, i.e. we regard
objects of C ′ as types of T ′, identity morphisms of C ′ as variables in T ′,
etc. The theory T ′, reconstructed in this way from the category C ′, is called
internal logic of C. This entire process can be regarded as a functor, called
Lang, from a category of categories, call it CATEGORIES, to a category of
theories, call it THEORIES,
Lang: CATEGORIES → THEORIES.
For the time being this definition remains informal since neither CATE-
GORIES nor THEORIES have been properly defined, but it will be done
below.
3Since f is now in CT rather than in T , it should formally be denoted by a different
symbol.
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Let us start with a formal theory T . We now want to organize it into
a category Syn(T ), called the syntactic category of T . It is done in the
following way.
Let Γ be a collection of type assertions, i.e. a collection of rules assigning
a type to each term of a given theory, and Φ a collection of all well defined
formulae of T . The pair (Γ,Φ) is called a context. It is a formalization of
what in ordinary language one means by this term.
If T is a type theory, its syntactic category, Syn(T), is defined as follows.
Its objects are contexts (Γ,Φ) and its morphisms (Γ,Φ) → (∆,Ψ) are in-
terpretations (or substitutions) of variables. The latter means that for each
type, prescribed by ∆, we must construct an expression of this type out of
data contained in Γ. In general, this is done by substituting terms from Γ for
variables in ∆. We must also present, for each assumption required by ∆ (if
there are any), a proof of this assumption from the assumptions contained
in Γ (for details see [11, 32]).
The category Syn(T), constructed in this way, is also called a category of
contexts (for details see [11, 31]).
Since from a theory T we have constructed the category Syn(T ), we can
have a functor,
Syn: THEORIES → CATEGORIES
provided we define the categories THEORIES and CATEGORIES. We do
this in the next section.
4 Syntax – Semantics Interaction
Let us start with objects for both of these categories. It is obvious that they
will be categories and theories, respectively. To have workable categories,
one must restrict the class of theories as candidates of being objects in THE-
ORIES (and analogously for CATEGORIES). The criterion one follows is
the kind of logic that underlines a given theory. It could be what logicians
call: finite product logic, regular logic, coherent logic, geometric logic, etc.
(as it could be expected, the internal logic of the corresponding semantic
category will be of the corresponding kind, i.e. finite product logic, regular
logic, etc.) [17]. For our further analysis it is irrelevant which one will be
chosen. However, for the sake of concreteness we may think about coherent
logic. Roughly speaking, this is a fragment of the first order logic which uses
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only the connectives ∧ and ∨, and the existential quantifier. Large parts
of mathematics can be formalised with the help of this logic. To this logic
there correspond coherent theories and coherent categories. They will con-
stitute objects of THEORIES and CATEGORIES, respectively. Morphisms
for CATEGORIES are obviously functors between corresponding categories;
for instance coherent functors for coherent categories [7]. Let now T1 and
T2 be objects in THEORIES. Morphism between T1 and T2, T1,→ T2, is a
functor between their corresponding syntactic theories Syn(T1) → Syn(T2).
Roughly speaking, this means that it is possible to express (to interpret) T1
in terms of T2 (for details and discussion see [14]).
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As a side remark let us notice that by studying the category THEORIES,
we could learn “how individual theories sit within it, and how theories are
related to each other” [14, p. 413]. This is nicely consonant with a newer
trend in the philosophy of science to investigate the so-called inter-theory
relations [5, 27].
A truly remarkable fact is that the functors Lang and Syn constitute a
pair of adjoint functors. Let us explain precisely what this means.
Let us consider any pair of objects: C of CATEGORIES and T of THE-
ORIES. Adjoint functors serve to compare them. However, they cannot be
compared directly since they live in different categories. Adjoint functors
serve to move each of them to the correct category so as to enable the com-
parison. Let us follow this process step by step [30, pp. 148-153].
Let us first consider the object T which lives in THEORIES. We want
to compare it with the object C which lives in CATEGORIES. We thus
move C to THEORIES with the help of the functor Lang to obtain the
object Lang(C). We now make the comparison with the help of a suitable
morphism,
f : Lang(C)→ T
in THEORIES. We do the same starting with C in CATEGORIES and T in
THEORIES, and compare C with Syn(T ),
g : C → Syn(T )
in CATEGORIES. To complete the definition of adjunction we demand that
morphisms f and g should constitute a pair of bijections which is natural
4Strictly speaking, CATEGORIES is a 2-category (since its objects are categories and
morphisms are functors), and THEORIES is a 2-category, in this case, called also a doctrine
[8].
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both in C and T (see below).
The above definition can be put into a concise form
THEORIES(Lang(C), T ) ∼= CATEGORIES(C, Syn(T )), (1)
expressing an isomorphism between the right and left hand sides of this for-
mula that is natural in C and T . The latter condition says that when C varies
in CATEGORIES and T varies in THEORIES, the isomorphism between
morphisms Lang(C)→ T in THEORIES and C → Syn(T ) in CATEGORIES
vary in a way that is compatible with the composition of morphisms in CAT-
EGORIES and THEORIES, correspondingly, and with the actions of Lang
and Syn on both these categories (see [20, pp. 50-51]).5
We should notice that in the above definition, in fact, we not only compare
objects of two different categories, but rather categories themselves (objects
C and T are any pair of objects). Moreover, comparing two categories we
are not so much interested in their objects, but rather in morphisms between
objects. This is clear from the fact that at the end, we have identified those
morphisms of two categories that are pairwise naturally isomorphic among
themselves.
As we can see, categorical logic does not simply creates a semantics for
a given language, but shows that dependencies between them go both ways:
in a sense, syntax and semantics create each other. More precisely, they
condition each other through the adjointness relation.
5 Realization and Abstraction
There is another aspect of categorical logic that we shall make use of, and
it may be seen as a mathematical description of the processes of abstraction
and realization of concepts. The category Syn(T ) representing a theory T
may be regarded as presenting a general concept, of which the theory T is
a particular syntactic description. For example, there is a theory TGroup
consisting of a single basic type X , and function symbols ∗ : X × X → X
and (−)−1 : X → X and a constant u : X , together with the usual equations
5For a full definition of adjoint functors see any textbook on category theory.
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for groups as its axioms:
x ∗ (y ∗ z) = (x ∗ y) ∗ z
x ∗ u = x
u ∗ x = x
x ∗ x−1 = u
x−1 ∗ x = u
The syntactic category Syn(TGroup) then represents the general concept of a
group. This concept can also be represented by another theory T ′Group with a
different choice of basic equations, or even a different choice of operations,6 as
long as the resulting categories Syn(TGroup) and Syn(T
′
Group) are equivalent.
A general concept may have many individual instances ; an instance of the
concept of a group is, of course, just a particular group: a set G of elements,
equipped with functions interpreting the operations of multiplication and
inverse, and satisfying the group equations. A logician would call such an
instance a model of the theory of groups, but we shall avoid this over-worked
term and refer to it instead as a realization of the theory of groups. A
realization of a theory T in any category C is essentially the same thing as a
functor Syn(T )→ C that preserves the relevant structure of the theory – in
the case of groups, the finite products X ×X . (This is in fact the defining
universal property of the syntactic category Syn(T ).) The realizations in the
category SET , consisting of all sets and functions, are thus exactly what we
called the instances of the general concept of a group, namely groups.
The standard category GROUP of all groups and their homomorphisms,
as usually defined in abstract algebra, is then essentially the same as the cat-
egory of all such instances, that is, the category REAL(Syn(TGroup), SET )
of all SET realizations, i.e. (structure-preserving) functors, where the mor-
phisms are just natural transformations of such functors (that these cor-
respond exactly to group homomorphisms is not trivial). In this way, for
any general concept Syn(T ) corresponding to a theory T we can define the
category of its SET realizations,
REAL(T ) =df REAL(Syn(T ), SET ),
which may be viewed as the category of instances of the concept Syn(T ).
6For example there is an axiomatization of groups using a single ternary operation in
place of the two operations x ∗ y and x−1).
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Now an amazing and mathematically deep fact emerges, which can only
be seen usng the tools of categorical logic: from the category REAL(T ) of
all instances of the concept presented by T , one can actually recover the
general concept Syn(T ). Indeed, for any structured category R of the same
kind as REAL(T ) (we will say a bit more about the condition “of the same
kind” below), one can consider all of the continuous functors f : R → SET ;
these may be regarded as “images” or “abstractions” of the (generalized) re-
alizations in R. The category of all such abstractions ABSTRACT(R, SET )
(again, with natural transformations as morphisms) may be called the ab-
stract of R, and written simply
ABSTRACT(R) =df ABSTRACT(R, SET ).
A similar construction that the reader may know is the ring C(X) = C(X,R)
of continuous, real-valued functions on a space X . The noteworthy fact
that we mentioned above is this: if for R we take a category REAL(T ) of
realizations of a theory T , then the abstract of REAL(T ), consisting of all
“abstractions” REAL(T ) → SET , will be the associated concept Syn(T ).7
Thus the abstraction of the realizations of a concept is the concept itself. We
can even summarize this briefly by saying that All concepts are abstract, since
every concept is the abstraction of its realizations. More generally, for any
suitable category R, the category ABSTRACT(R) of all continuous functors
f : R → SET (the “abstractions” of R) is a general concept, of which R is
either the category of realizations, or an approximation thereof.
The general correspondence is given by a (contravariant!) adjunction
between the functors of Realization and Abstraction which relate these op-
erations; schematically,
CONCEPTS
Realization
%%
INSTANCESop
Abstraction
dd
Here CONCEPTS is the category consisting of all “conceptual” categories
Syn(T ) and their (relative) “realizations”, i.e. functors Syn(T ) → Syn(T ′),
and the functor of Realization is defined by taking realizations in SET ,
Realization(Syn(T )) = REAL(Syn(T ), SET ) .
7Under suitable assumptions, and up to the relevant notion of equivalence, of course;
see [2] for the general theory.
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which we also called the category of “instances” of the concept.
And INSTANCES is the category consisting of all (generalizaed) cate-
gories of instances R (such as the categories GROUP , RING, etc.) with
their “continuous” functors R → R′, and the functor of Abstraction is de-
fined by taking continuous functors into SET ,
Abstraction(R) = ABSTRACT(R, SET ) .
which we called “abstractions” of the category R.
Let us consider a simple example! Propositional logic consists of basic
propositional variables x, y, z, . . . and constants⊤,⊥, which can be made into
formulae using the usual propositional connectives ¬z , x ∧ y , x ∨ y , x ⇒ z,
and which are assumed to satisfy the usual logical laws, such as x∧ (y∨ z) =
(x ∧ y) ∨ (x ∧ z) , ¬¬x = x, etc. A theory T in this simplified case is just
a set of propositional letters V = {p1, p2, . . . , pn} (regarded a 0-ary relation
symbols), and a list of propositional formulae A = {α1, α2, . . . , αm} built up
from these letters, as the axioms of the theory. There are no types, typed
variables, or function symbols (or rather, there is a single, implicit type 1),
and the logical symbols are just the propositional connectives.
The syntactic category Syn(T ), representing the “concept”, is then the
Boolean algebra F (V )/A obtained as the free Boolean algebra F (V ) on the
variables V as generators, quotiented by the filter generated by the axioms
A. This “concept” associated to the propositional theory T = (V,A) is
independent of the particular syntactic presentation (V,A). A realization of
T is then a boolean homomorphism F (V )/A → 2, where 2 = {0, 1} is the
Boolean algebra of truth values. Thus such a realization is just a truth-value
assignment to the variables in V , in such a way that the “conditions” in A
are all satisfied, i.e. the elements a ∈ A are all taken to the value “true” (in
other words, a “model” of the propositional theory T ). For instance, if the
theory T is V = {x, y} and A = {x ∨ y,¬(x ∧ y)}, then a realization would
be an assignment of x to an actual sentence p, and y to one q, such that only
one of p and q is true (or more formally, a direct assignement of such truth
values, by-passing the actual sentences). Under our description above, such
a realization is an instance of the general concept F (V )/A.
Now, such realizations are exactly the points of the Stone space
Stone(F (V )/A), the topological space associated to the Boolean algebra
F (V )/A under the celebrated Stone duality theorem [18] – which is in fact
the “propositional logic” case of the categorical logical duality that we are
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considering here. Formally, the points of Stone(F (V )/A) are prime filters in
F (V )/A, and the topology has basic open sets determined by the elements
of F (V )/A. The Boolean algebra F (V )/A can be recovered from this space
Stone(F (V )/A) as the algebra of continuous functions Stone(F (V )/A) → 2
into the discrete space 2, with the pointwise Boolean operations. These ab-
stractions of Stone(F (V )/A) form a Boolean algebra Bool(Stone(F (V )/A))
which, by Stone duality, is isomorphic to F (V )/A,
Bool(Stone(F (V )/A)) ∼= F (V )/A .
Indeed, for any (not necessarily Stone) space X , we can form the Boolean
algebra Bool(X) of continuous functionsX → 2, and the original spaceX will
then map canonically to Stone(Bool(X)), giving the “best approximation”
of X by a Stone space.
In the general case, in categorical logic we consider many other fragments
of logic — propositional, equational, coherent, first-order — and for each
such subsystem there is an associated Realization-Abstraction adjunction
between theories, and the concepts they represent, on the one hand, and their
realizations by instances of these concepts, on the other. The propositional
theories just considered give rise to Stone duality [18]; equational theories
(like groups) give rise to Lawvere duality [1]; coherent and first-order logic
are treated by analogous duality theories developed by Makkai and others
[22, 3]. In each diffferent case, the associated notion of structured category,
structure-preserving functor, continuous functor, etc., is suitably adapted to
the respective situation. Many of these logical dualities are discussed from
the standpoint of categorical logic in the paper [2].
6 Categories BRAIN and MIND
So far everything that has been said has merely been a reminder of standard
and well known things. From now on, everything will be hypothetical and
highly simplified. The bold and maximally simplified hypothesis is that neu-
rons in the brain can be modeled as categories, the internal logic of which
is sufficiently complex (yet manageable). Of course, our inspiring motive
is the human brain and in constructing our model we shall try to imitate
what is going on it; however, being conscious of our simplified and highly
idealized assumptions, we prefer to speak about a homunculus brain. Our
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homunculus is a kind of “mathematical robot”, the aim of which is to pro-
vide us with the opportunity to study how such a simple brain-like structure
could “create meanings” out of its purely syntactic program. Our other dras-
tically simplifying assumption consists in systematically ignoring all of the
brain’s functions and processes that are not directly related to the proposed
syntax–semantics relationship.
As it is well known, neurons communicate through signals transmitted
via: presynaptic (source) neuron – axon – synapse – dendrite – postsynaptic
(target) neuron, and this via is unidirectional. In our homunculus model,
these transmission processes will be regarded as functors between categories
(neurons).
Let us consider the category CATEGORIES, which we now aptly call
BRAIN. Its objects are categories modeling neurons, and morphisms are
functors between these categories.
We thus assume that each neuron in the homunculus brain is represented
by a category (belonging to a certain class of categories; in the following we
shall simply say that a neuron is a category). At the moment, we are not
interested which biological mechanisms implement this assumption. Every-
thing that counts in this model is the assumption that neurons consist of
collections of objects and morphisms satisfying conditions from the category
definition. We should have in mind that these simple conditions might lead
to highly complicated structures.
Morphisms (arrows) in the category CATEGORIES are functors between
object-categories, that is to say axons through which neurons communicate
with each other. The crucial thing is that they must satisfy the usual con-
ditions for morphisms: composition of morphisms, its associativity, the exis-
tence of identity morphisms. With the latter there is no problem: no output
from a neuron counts as its identity morphism. To check whether two other
conditions are verified in the human brain would require going deeper into
the neural structure of our brain. In the case of the homunculus brain, this
is not necessary. Since the homunculus is of our construction, we simply
assume that synapses in its brain well compose and do so in the associative
way.
The next step seems obvious. Each neuron (modeled as a category C ∈
BRAIN) has its own program enabling its working, i.e. an internal logic
underlying this program. We thus can define a counterpart of Lang(C) which
is a “theory” of this neuron. It is reasonable to claim that it is an object of
the category THEORIES which we now call MIND, and the functor Lang:
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BRAIN → MIND is defined in analogy to that between CATEGORIES and
THEORIES.
What about the morphisms between such objects? We proceed in strict
analogy with what has been done in THEORIES. Let now T1 and T2 be ob-
jects in MIND, a morphism between them, T1,→ T2, is a functor between
their corresponding syntactic theories, i.e. Syn(T1) → Syn(T2), where the
functor Syn: MIND → BRAIN is defined in analogy to that between THE-
ORIES and CATEGORIES.
The analogy is only apparently straightforward. In fact, it is based on a
huge extrapolation, and as such highly hypothetical, but it is worth exploring
it since the problem at stake deserves even a higher risk. By pursuing this
analogy we could claim that also in this case the functors Lang and Syn are
adjoint functors. If so, we have a very interesting conjunction between brain
and mind; it is interesting even if brain and mind are modeled by such a
naive construction.
Neurons, their interactions and programs underlying their working are, in
contrast with abstract categories like CATEGORIES and THEORIES, real
things, at least in the homunculus world, and we are entitled to suppose that
the functors Lang and Syn between Brain and Mind really do what they
formally signify (like our phase portrait on the computer screen really did
what the program told it to do).
Roughly speaking the functor Lang provides a collection of theories
(mind) for a collection of neurons (brain), and the functor Syn transfers
the syntax of these theories to the network of neurons. The action of these
two functors is adjoint; consequently it determines a strict interaction be-
tween BRAIN and MIND. Let C be any object (a neuron) in BRAIN and T
any object (the theory of this neuron) in MIND, then equation (1) assumes
the form
MIND(Lang(C), T ) ∼= BRAIN(C, Syn(T )). (2)
The natural isomorphism ∼= appearing in this equation is crucial. It states
that when we go from neuron to neuron as objects in BRAIN, and their
corresponding theories vary in THEORIES, then the isomorphism between
morphisms Lang(C) → T in MIND and C → Syn(T ) in BRAIN varies in a
way that is compatible with the composition of morphisms in BRAIN and
MIND, correspondingly, and with the actions of the functors Lang and Syn
(see [20]).8 Finally, the “higher” cognitive functions of abstraction and re-
8For a full discussion of the role of the naturality condition in the definition of adjoint
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alization of concepts are modelled by a corresponding adjunction between
the assocated functors Abstraction and Realization relating these categories
BRAIN and MIND. We could summarise the situation by saying that the
categories BRAIN and MIND interact with each other with their entire struc-
tures and, at the same time, these very structures are shaped by this inter-
action.
7 A Comment
The interactions between syntax and semantics are omnipresent both in our
everyday conversations and in various forms of practicing science. The world
around us is full of meanings and our attempts to decipher them. Science
could be regarded as a machine to produce signs, through experimentation
and critical reasoning, and extracting from combinations of them information
about the structure of the world. Logicians put a lot of effort to make the
syntax – semantics interaction precise. As we have seen in section 2, despite
the fact that formal languages are lacking any external references, it was
possible to create semantical references for them by cleverly exploiting the
relation between language and its metalanguage. In categorical logic the
situation has improved. Any formal theory T , generates via the functor
Syn the category Syn(C) = CT of which it is a theory, i.e. CT provides a
“natural” semantics for T . And vice versa, any (sufficiently rich) category
C ′, via the functor Lang, generates its own theory Lang(C ′) = T ′C′ which
constitutes the internal logic of C ′. It is interesting to notice that TCT does
not coincide with T , they are only Morita equivalent. Here, we shall not go
into technical details; it is enough to say that two Morita equivalent theories
could be regarded as two interpretations of the same theory [13].
The fact that TCT does not coincide with T is a consequence of the fact
that the functors Lan and Syn are not mutually inverse functors but consti-
tute a pair of adjoint functors. This in turn implies that in categorical logic
the interaction between syntax and semantics is skillfully complex, with cre-
ative influences coming both ways.
All the above discussed properties of the syntax – semantics interaction
are obviously preserved if applied to the categories BRAIN and MIND. There
is only one big difference: now “neurons and their theories” are real things
functors see any textbook on category theory.
18
(although in a highly idealised version of the homunculus world). Never-
theless, the situation is not so different from the one which we can observe
in many empirical sciences, in which some abstract mathematical structures
model some real processes (always more or less idealised). We should not
be surprised that the method of mathematical modeling works when applied
to our cognitive processes, but rather that mathematical structures not only
describe the real world (whether it is our brain or the world of physics),
but that they are also effectively acting in it (like in the little arrow on the
computer screen).
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